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Abstract
This study examines the agency problems by estimating the informat ional and relat ional
eVects of physician-pat ients on their invasive end-of-life t reatment. To address potential issues
of pat ient select ion, we compare treatment intensity between physician- versus nonphysician-
patients at tended by the same doctor in the same hospital, and cont rol for patients previous
choicesof doctors. To ident ify therelat ional eVect, wefurther compare the impactsof physician-
patients specializing in the same area as their attending doctors versus those in diVerent areas.
Physician-patients receivemore care than comparable nonphysician-patients, and the increased
volumeresultsmostly from physician-pat ients relat ional advantages, not from their information
advantages. JEL: D83, I11, J44. Keywords: physician practice style; communication and
information; end-of-li fe medical care
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A growing literature in labor economicsexamines thequestion of whether complete information
or strong social t ies can solve agency problems (e.g., Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2009; Jackson
and Schneider 2011). Health economists recently join thisdiscussion by randomizing physician race
and incentives to black men (Alsan, Garrick, and Graziani 2018) or using rotat ing call schedules as
an exogenous variation in doctor-pat ient relat ionships (Johnson et al. 2016). Building upon this
literature, we use a large administrat ive database to study the dist inct roles of informat ion and
human relat ions in physician treatment choice for patients at the end of life.
Researchers and policymakers are interested in the cost of end-of-life care, given the wide
regional variat ion in its contribut ion to overall medical spending, a variation that markedly
increases as the time to death nears (French et al. 2017).? This considerable variation in
end-of-life medical spending raises the question of how and when invasive care treatments are
used, especially in the case of chronic diseases. We examine this issue by exploring whether the
variat ion in end-of-life spending can be explained by diVerences in treatment patterns between
physician- versus nonphysician-patients, who diVer considerably for their medical knowledge and
social t ies with their attending doctors. Although past studies have examined several possible
reasons for high expenditures, few have focused on end-of-life health care. One notable except ion
is Einav et al. (2018), who show death t iming is highly unpredictable, suggest ing end-of-life
medical spending is not necessarily a waste, and the proximity to death is an arguably plausible
control for morbidity. This paper examines agency problems with end-of-life hospital care, by
addressing the question of whether inpatient doctors use the same amount of invasive treatment
for physician- and nonphysician-patients in the last six months of life.
Previous research exploring this empirical question within thehealthcarecontext has examined
whether physician mothers are more/ less likely to have a Cesarean section than nonphysician-
mothers. These studies ®nd mixed results.? On the one hand, Gryt ten, Skau, and Sørensen (2011)
?For hospital spending in the last twelve months of life in 2011, Japan has 8 percent of its aggregate hospital
expenditures, Quebec 23 percent, and theUnited States 10 percent. For the spending in the last three calendar years
of life, Japan is up to 14 percent and the United States about 16 percent, while Taiwan reaches 35 percent.
?Bunker and Brown (1974) and Hay and Leahy (1982) ®nd that physician-pat ients tend to use more healthcare
although both studies omit hospital factors. Bronnenberg et al. (2015) and Carrera and Skipper (2017) ®nd
that pharmacists/ physicians recommend diVerent drugs/ t reatments for pat ients from what they would choose for
themselves. Levit t and Syverson (2008) adopt the same approach to test for agency problems when consumers are
experts. However, as Ubel, Angot, and Zikmund-Fisher (2011) and Shaban, Guerry, and Quill (2011) note, the
treatments that physicians choose for themselvesmight not be comparablewith the treatment that they would apply
to pat ients because the diVerence in those treatments might also capture the diVerence in suscept ibility to choose
self-t reatments versus treating others, not necessarily re¯ ect ing the physician-pat ients eVect on treatment choice.
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®nd that physician-mothers are more likely to receive a Cesarean sect ion, which they attribute
to a closer relat ionship or better communication with attending doctors. On the other hand,
Chou et al. (2006) and Johnson and Rehavi (2016) ®nd that physician-mothers are less likely to
receive a Cesarean section, which they attribute to access to better information about potential
complicat ions and side eVects. However, the conjectured relational and informational advantages
aVorded physician-mothers are empirically inseparable when restrict ing the scope of analysis to
one medical specialty. Through relaxing this restrict ion, our study contributes to the empirical
literatureon agency problemsby evaluating the relat ive importanceof relat ional and informational
eVects on the choice of invasive care in end-of-life treatment.
In any study of physician-pat ient eVects on treatment choice, there is a potential pat ient
select ion bias. Physician-patients are typically more capable than nonphysician-patients of
choosing speci®c doctors who can provide the desired level of medical care, even within the same
hospital. Because doctors diVer in procedure skills or pract ice styles and becausepat ients diVer in
their preexist ing demand for t reatment intensity, these diVerences may confound the observed
diVerence in treatment choice between physician- and nonphysician-patients. To address the
patient select ion bias issue, we use a combinat ion of a data matching scheme and econometric
models. Speci®cally, we hold patients prior doctor choices constant and compare the treatment
options of physician- and nonphysician-patients at tended by the same doctor within the same
hospital. Doing so allows us to control for doctors pract ice style and patients demand for
intensive care, which are unobservable to researchers.
For this study, weuseTaiwanesehealth insurancedata between 2000 and 2006, collected by the
National Health Insurance (NHI) Administrat ion.? In Taiwan, part icipat ion in the NHI systems
is mandatory, and thus the data includes all insurance part icipants, including those who have
never checked into a hospital. Given the national fee schedule, doctors cannot indulge in price
discrimination against pat ients, regardless of the hospital type, and patients can freely choose
attending doctorswithout going through a gatekeeper. Addit ionally, the rat io of thepalliat ivecare
users to the number of deaths is as low as approximately one percent during our data period, and
theNHI hasnot covered hospice careuntil the end of our data period. These inst itut ional features
?Chen and Chuang (2016) systemat ically evaluate the credibility of theNHI Databaseby comparing the database
with survey data and oYcial stat ist ics.
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allow us to overcome potent ial select ion biases in focusing on pat ient choices, doctor attributes,
and invasive procedures performed in hospitals.
Using the NHI data, we construct doctor-hospital ®xed eVect models, including patient
at tributes and previous doctor choice, to obtain a select ion-bias-adjusted estimate of the
physician-pat ient impact on treatment choices. Our results suggest that physician- and
nonphysician-patients have about the same probability of using most of the end-of-life invasive
care procedures. However, we ®nd that physician-patients ut ilize 1.4 percentage points more care
volume, relat ive to identical pat ients treated by the same doctor in the same hospital (table 4),
without staying longer in a hospital or paying more out of pocket. The est imated eVect on care
volume is non-negligible because it accounts for about six percent of the variability in the
treatment decision within the doctor and hospital given the same month, with stat ist ical
signi®cance at conventional levels. Notably, including pat ients prior choices of physicians in our
regressions adjusts the est imated impact upward by 44 percent or more (table 3) while excluding
doctors who have never at tended a physician-patient adjusts the estimates downward by more
than one half (table 4). These ®ndings suggest that both the diVerent ial pat ient sort ing and the
unobserved diVerences in doctor quality can explain a large portion of the gap in treatment
intensity between physician- and nonphysician-pat ients.
A crit ical concern for our end-of-life analysis is that restrict ing the data by proximity to death
might have biased the estimates. If physicians have a longer life expectancy and if those who die
later would use less invasive care, then our end-of-life analysis understates the physician-patient
eVects on invasive care; the estimated coeYcient on physician-pat ients would have been higher if
we could also include survivors in our analysis.
Furthermore, using a simple extension of the doctor-hospital ®xed eVect model, we ®nd that
our observed increased volume of invasive care among physician-pat ients at the end of life results
mostly from the relational advantage of physician-patients (when belonging to the same specialty
category as their attending doctors) rather than the informat ional advantage (when specializing
in a surgical area). We ®nd that this relational premium is substantial as it exceeds the total
physician-pat ient impact by three percentage points and accounts for 15 percent of the variability
in treatment choice for a given doctor and hospital.
Our ®nding of dist inct relational and informational advantages in physician-patient t reatment
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choices is consistent with the previous ®ndings regarding the utilizat ion of a Cesarean section.
Although physician-mothers have a lower rate of Cesarean section than nonphysician-mothers
(Johnson and Rehavi 2016), this rate increases with a strong preexist ing clinical relat ionship
between general patients and attending doctors since the doctors aremore likely to be empathetic
and more willing to reduce pain during childbirth by recommending a Cesarean section (Johnson
et al. 2016). Following Johnson et al. (2016), we also include all pat ients preexisting clinical
relat ionship with their doctors. Our result shows that such clinical relat ionships decreased
invasive care volume for general patients, contrary to the posit ive impact of having a closer
professional relat ionship on invasive care volume for physician-patients because of bet ter
communication. To our knowledge, this study is the ®rst in the literature to explore the
diVerent ial eVects of having a preexist ing clinical relationship, a professional relat ionship, and an
informational advantage on treatment choice.
We further extend our analysis and ®nd that the relat ive signi®cance of the professional
relat ionship eVect on invasive care decreases with the introduction of a global expenditure cap in
2002. As context, in 2002, the Taiwanese NHI administration began capping hospital care
budgets in each region. These budget caps resulted in a zero-sum game that intensi®ed both
quantity competit ion and demand inducement likely because the markup remained suYcient ly
high despite the global-budget caps (Mougeot and Naegelen 2005; Earle, Schmedders, and Tature
2007; Cheng 2015). Our results verify that quantity competit ion has intensi®ed after 2002,
particularly at the end of reimbursement season. Our results also show that the global-budget
reduces the dominant role of the professional relat ionship eVects on physician-patient t reatment
options although the estimated reduction is stat ist ically insigni®cant. Overall, the global-budget
caps seem to have closed the gap in invasive care ut ilizat ion/ volume between physician- and
nonphysician-patients because of the combination of quantity compet it ion and the decreased
impact of physician-patients professional relat ionship on treatment options.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the clinical and inst itut ional
set tings. Section 2 describes our matching scheme in construct ing the study sample and
summarizes our data features and descript ive stat ist ics. In Section 3, we introduce our
econometric models, report the core estimates, implement robustness checks, and discuss possible
interpretat ions. Sect ion 4 considers alternative explanations for our data and undertakes
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additional analysis of the data in an attempt between the alternat ives. Section 5 extends the
econometric models to dist inguish relational eVects from informational advantages of t reatment
intensity and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
1 Clinical and Institutional Settings
1.1 Patient Cost Sharing and Provider Reimbursement
Similar to theCanadian and German healthcaresystems, theTaiwaneseNHI isamandatory single-
payer system for all cit izens and residents that consists of one uniform comprehensive carebene®ts
package covering drugs, hospital, and primary care (Hsiao et al. 2016). Because part icipat ion
in the NHI is mandatory, there is no issue of adverse select ion into insurance. Within the NHI
system, almost all pat ients choose their physicians direct ly, given theminimal penalty for visit ing
a hospital without a primary care referral (7 USD in 2014) and low co-pays ranging from 2 to 14
USD. Furthermore, the NHI charges no deduct ible and sets no cap on out-of-pocket expenditure,
choosing instead to manage health expenditure in¯ation through provider reimbursement.
Before 2002, the NHI reimbursed providers solely on a fee-for-service basis. In this system,
hospitals, in turn, pay doctors with a combination of fees-for-services plus a basic salary that
varies across hospitals, meaning that doctors and hospitals have similar ®nancial incentives. Since
July 2002, the NHI has followed Canada, France, and Germany in imposing a regional-level global
hospital care budget to curb rapidly increasing expenditure. This global budget is determined
annually by a committee of providers, academics, and representat ives of premium payers. It also
takes account of in¯ation, previous spending, populat ion size, and new technologies. While the
NHI system precludesprice-discrimination, a suYcient ly largemarkup under theglobal budget can
incentivize providers to  expand their volume of services to maximize their share of the common
budget, making it a classic zero-sum game (Cheng 2015; also seeMougeot and Naegelen 2005).
To reconcile the fee-for-service structure and the global-budget cap, the NHI administrator
assigns a reimbursement point value to each possible service, with a conversion rate calculated ex-
post by the rat io of the global budget cap to the total number of points in the region. As a result ,
providers face an uncertain reimbursement value for services as well as an uncertain marginal
revenue. These uncertaint ies create incentives for providers to control the volume collect ively
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for a higher conversion rate if the expected markup is small and decreasing with volume (Earle,
Schmedders, and Tatur 2007). By contrast, a suYciently high markup leads to a zero-sum gameas
there is no bene®t from controlling volume. In equilibrium, hospitals adjust the expected markup
unt il when quantity control and quantity competit ion are equally pro®table to all hospitals within
the region.
1.2 Invasive Care Utilization
To examine whether physician-patients receive higher volumes of invasive care as part of their
end-of-life t reatment, we identify four procedures for our study: nasogastric intubation feeding,
urinal catheterization, and endotracheal intubation, and tracheostomy intubat ion. Each of these
treatments requires an aYdavit signed by a family member. Thus, the choice of an invasive care
treatment depends on both supply and demand for invasive care. Clinical situations do not
always precisely indicate to wean or apply an invasive procedure, and the medical guidelines and
recommendat ions often leave room for discrepancies between appropriate and potent ially
inappropriate uses. In pract ice, while tubes and catheters may be placed for appropriate reasons,
it is possible they are not removed prompt ly if pat ients or caregivers express a desire to maintain
their use as a substitute for nursing care (e.g., Roland, Mansour, and Schwarz 2012; Meddings et
al. 2014).
Medical guidelines recommend using nasogastric intubation feeding when pat ients can digest
but cannot eat or swallow. Urinary catheterizat ion is recommended when a patient has bladder
outlet obstruct ion, or there is a need to measure urinary output. Both procedures could have
some potential complicat ions although none is fatal. For example, complicat ions associated with
nasogastric intubation, such asdehydrat ion, skin issues, or gastrointest inal disorders, areuncommon
and easy to manage. Urinary catheters are likely to cause urinary tract infect ions, which rout inely
cleaning catheters can prevent.
Our third and fourth measures of invasive care are forms of mechanical ventilat ion, which
is recommended during episodes of acute respiratory failure or as an ongoing ventilat ion option.
During episodes of acute respiratory failure, most patients are ventilated through an endotracheal
tube. Use of endotracheal tube requires suctioning to clear the airway, but routine suctioning
may cause fatal complications, such as desaturat ion, pneumonia, arrhythmias, and bronchospasm.
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When ongoing ventilat ion is needed, patients are ventilated through a tracheostomy tube. While a
tracheostomy tubemay induce complicat ions such as air trapping, experienced surgeons can avoid
or address theseissues. Caregiversmust prevent complicat ions from a tracheostomy tube(e.g., such
as infect ion or accidental removal of the tube), but the long-term care workload is much less than
with an endotracheal tube. Long-term useof a tracheostomy tubecan result in thedevelopment of
granulat ion t issue, narrowing of the airway, or failure of the tracheal stoma to close after removal
of the tube, all of which requires an addit ional surgical procedure for repair.?
In 2000, to address the issueof ICU capacity shortages, theNHI init iated a payment program to
encouragemechanical vent ilat ion weaning in a non-ICU sett ing for both acuteand chronic patients.
Since then, use of mechanical ventilat ion has risen rapidly, with tracheostomy intubat ion showing
the steepest increase. Indeed, the aggregate expense for mechanical vent ilat ion accounts for 6
percent of the total 2005 NHI budget, according to the 2008 NHI Administrat ions annual report.
To put this increase in context, we note that between 1997 and 2004, mechanical ventilat ion usage
rose at least 180 percent while the total hospital inpatient days increased by no more than 50
percent (Cheng, Jan, and Liu 2008). Among patients in the last six months of life between 2001
and 2006, the utilization rates range from 22 percent of endotracheal tube insert ion to 48 percent
of nasogastric intubation feeding. About 61 percent of hospitalized patients use one of the four
invasive care procedures (column 1 of table 3).
2 Data and Summary Statistics
2.1 Data Construction
We obtain data for the period 2000 to 2006 from the central database of Taiwans NHI
Administration, which provides unique identi®ers and detailed information on all providers,
physicians, and patients in the system, except for military personnel and their families. The
database coversmore than 90 percent of hospitals under contract with the NHI system.
An essential featureof theNHI database is that it providesdata on both bene®ciarieswho have
? In a large representat ive sample of hospital pat ients who have vent ilated through a tracheostomy tube for at
least 21 days in the hospital during 19982003, Lu et al. (2012) ®nd that the average pat ient cont inues to use a
tracheostomy for an addit ional 66 days. Approximately one half of those in the study died within threemonths after
being discharged from the hospital and more than 90 percent within six months.
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never checked into a hospital and those who have been admit ted. To capture the possibility that
patientsmay check into diVerent hospitalsor into thesamehospital to seevariousphysiciansduring
our sample period, we set our unit of observation as hospital admission and both bene®ciaries who
have ever checked into a hospital and those who have never checked into a hospital. Hospitals
in Taiwan follow a closed-staV structure where the on-staV doctor assumes full responsibility for
the patient s medical care. This inst itutional setting ensures that our patient-physician matched
dataset well-de®nes the interact ions between doctors and patients during each hospital admission.
To construct our master data set, we ®rst obtain Cause of Death Data from the NHI
Administration database for our sample period. We then match this information to the NHI
Registry for all bene®ciaries, which contains each bene®ciarys socioeconomic attributes such as
sex, birthday, work status, registry location, and income (which is reported by the premium payer
if the bene®ciary is a dependent). Because the last three attributes can vary over t ime, we use the
information recorded during the penult imate year, as in Chen and Chuang (2016). Speci®cally, we
calculate individual income by averaging over all income levels during the penultimate year. For
work status and registry locat ion, we use the latest record during the penultimate year. Although
this data step drast ically complicates our data work, it ensures that all the covariates have been
determined before the year of death.
To obtain thedata of deceased physician-pat ients, wematch our master data set to theRegistry
for Medical Personnel which contains information about each doctors sex, birthday, and date of
cert i®cat ion, including ret irees. For our physician- and nonphysician-patients, we then match each
deceased person to his or her hospital admissions information (if any) using the Reimbursement
Claim Data, which consists of data on inpat ient expenditures by admissions. Weuse this matched
data to obtain hospital typeand location aswell as the respect iveunique identi®ers for thehospital
and attending doctor.
To derive our sample of at tending doctors, we link the above-matched data to the Registry
for Board-Cert i®ed Specialists, which indicates each doctors specialty, work history, and practice
location(s) sincebeing cert i®ed. Notethat an attendingdoctor may havemult iplepracticelocations
because of relocation or because a single pract ice hasmult iple locat ions.
Finally, to obtain our data on the use of invasive care for each hospital admission, we link
the matched dataset to the Physician Orders for Inpat ients data, which includes both treatment
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decisions and medical supply usage. This data also allows us to observeeach inpatients t reatment
history during our sampleperiod. Weusephysician orders, instead of ICD codes (mostly missing in
the database), to ident ify the volume and utilizat ion of a speci®c invasive care procedure to avoid
potent ial misreport ing issues associated with ICD codes.?
2.2 Summary Statistics
In assessing theuseof invasivecarein end-of-lifet reatment, weconsider threesetsof outcomesin the
last six monthsof life: (1) theutilizat ion of hospital care, measured as thetotal number of days in a
hospital; (2) the ut ilizat ion of any of the four invasive procedures  nasogastric intubat ion feeding,
urinal catheterizat ion, endotracheal intubation, and tracheostomy intubation; and (3) carevolumes
and hospital expenditures associated with a pat ient , both converted to standardized percentiles.
Among 989 deceased doctors, the youngest doctor died at age29. To form a comparison group, we
include 765,649 nonphysician bene®ciaries who died at age 29 or older during the data period.
Our end-of-life summary stat ist ics in Table 1, based on both hospital-admitted and
non-hospital-admitted bene®ciaries, show that physicians are 13 percent (0.10/ 0.75) more likely
than nonphysicians to check into a hospital and that their hospital stays are about 16 days or 25
percent (15.95/ 64.38) longer. We further ®nd that physicians are 16 percent (0.08/ 0.51) more
likely to receive one of the four invasive care procedures. The summary statist ics also show that,
upon adoption, physicians utilize 6 percent (3.58/ 60.1) more care volume while spending 12
percent (6.93/ 57.3) less out of pocket, compared to nonphysicians. The gap in the use of a
tracheostomy tube, in part icular, is about 13 percent (0.07/ 0.55) of nonphysicians ut ilizat ion.
Although only a handful of physicians check into an emergency room (ER) in the last six months
of life in our sample, this subset st ill has a 7 percent (3.89/ 56.8) higher probability of receiving an
endotracheal tube insert ion. Our further analyses show that these diVerences are driven most ly
by pat ient select ion and past ut ilizat ion, as we explain later.
The stat ist ics in Table 1 also show that our physician-patients live six years longer on average
and are at least 78 percent more likely to be admitted into surgery or another highly specialized
?Each order code for a procedure consists of ®ve digits followed by one let ter, and each code for a medical supply
consistsof three let ters, followed by ninedigitsor let ters. Nasogastric intubation iscoded by 47017C, 47018C, 47019C,
or CFD0216120W6; urinal catheterizat ion 47013C, 47014C, CKF03FL000EF, or CKF042103NWN; endotracheal
intubat ion 47031C or CRT02C0050WN; and tracheostomy intubation 57001B or 57002B.
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department (e.g., neurology, otolaryngology, or orthopedic surgery; not reported in the table).
Since we expect that the costs for those who live longer and receive more specialized care are
higher for both physician- and nonphysician-patients, our analysis includes pat ient demographics
and department-®xed eVect in the regressions.
Cont inuing with Table 1, we see that physician-pat ients show a 13 percent (0.10/ 0.75) higher
hospitalization ratethan nonphysician-patientsand that they are65percentagepointsmorelikely to
seea chosen doctor for their end-of-life treatment. Finally, weseethat physician- and nonphysician-
patients areequally likely to dieof a heart at tack, whilephysician-patients signi®cantly more likely
died of chronic disease or cancer. In contrast , acute diseases or unnatural causes are less likely to
result in death among physician-patients. ThesediVerencesmay be driven by patients preexist ing
health condit ions, lifestyles, or socioeconomic status, as wewill discuss further in Sect ion 5.
Table2 presentsour summary stat ist ics for attending physicians in our study. Our data includes
17,401 doctors who have treated an end-of-life patient , of which 2,390 are considered to be chosen
doctors (since they havetreated at least onephysician-patient in the last month of their life). While
these chosen doctors account for less than 14 percent of the physicians in the data, they comprise
28 percent of the invasive care t reatments prescribed within their respective medical specialt ies.
Compared to unchosen doctors, we®nd that chosen doctorsaremoreexperienced, morespecialized
(as indicated by fewer specialty cert i®cates) part icularly in internal medicine, morelikely to relocate
or work in mult iple locations, and more likely to work in privatehospitals. They also receiveabout
®ve percentiles greater reimbursement and have patients who pay three percentiles less out of
pocket.
Finally, we summarize the descript ive stat ist ics of our outcome variables in the ®rst two
columns of table 3. We report the sample mean and standard deviation over all
nonphysician-patients hospital admissions during the last six months of life. The stat ist ics show
that the average hospital stay for a nonphysician-patient is 42 days per admission and that about
61 percent of admit ted nonphysician-patients receive an invasive procedure. The speci®c
treatment ut ilizat ion rate ranges from 22 percent for endotracheal intubation to 48 percent for
nasogastric intubat ion. We standardize the care volumes and costs in all tables and cluster
standard errors and deviat ions at patient levels.
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3 Main Empirical Estimates
To determine whether physician-patients experience an informational or relat ional advantage in
their end-of-life treatment, we use a series of ®xed-eVect regressions. This methodology is
appropriate as it is a standard approach to empirically testing agency problems when consumers
are experts (Levit t and Syverson 2008, Bronnenberg et al. 2015) or, in our case, when physicians
treat physician-patients (Johnson and Rehavi 2016). Following the same econometric sett ing in
the previous literature, we begin with a basic model for the invasive care utilizat ion Y of patient i
in hospital h during year-month t:
Yiht = aht + bDi + gXiht + uiht, (1)
where D is a physician-patient dummy with the parameter of interest b , and the coeYcient a
captureshospital- and time-®xed eVects. ThecovariatesX includeapatient srisk factors(measured
by past ut ilizat ion during the penult imate six months of life), socioeconomic characterist ics, and
district ®xed eVects, as well as time-varying characterist ics of both the hospital and the district at
the time thepatient is admitted. Finally, theerror term u re¯ ects random factors in thedecision to
prescribe an invasive procedure. Because of the richness of our data, we also control for hospital-
department ®xed eVects. It is noteworthy that this conventional model assumes the absence of
patient select ion; that is, doctors in the samehospitalshave thesamepract ice style, and physician-
and nonphysician-patients who choose the same hospital have the same demand for invasive care.
Next, we extend this model to address the issue of potent ial patient select ion bias by adding
more controls and matching physician- and nonphysician-patients by the same attending doctor:
Yijht = aht + bDi + gXiht + dWjt + qj h+ uijht, (2)
where q represents the doctor-hospital ®xed eVect that captures each doctors attributes and
practice style. Since 58 percent of the doctors in our study practice across multiple locat ions,
including this ®xed eVect in our model allows for the possibility that a given attending doctor
may vary his or her pract ice style across locations. W indicates an attending doctors years of
experience at the t ime a patient is admitted to a hospital, thus allowing us to capture
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t ime-varying factors that might in¯uence doctor pract ice styles over time.
Moreover, in the above regression, we include a patients previous choice of doctor (or patient
choosiness) in the covariate set X , de®ned as the fract ion of the pat ient s hospital admissions
attended by a chosen doctor during the ®nal year of life. By construct ion, all physician-patients
have their choosiness measure equal to one. For nonphysician-pat ients, patient choosiness ranges
from zero to one, re¯ ecting their level of choosiness compared to physician-pat ients. Pat ients who
havenever seen a chosen doctor have their choosinessmeasureequal to zero. If choosiness re¯ ects a
patient s private informat ion about their preexisting demand for invasive care and doctor practice
styles, the inclusion of this measure in our estimation can mit igate potential select ion bias.
Wepresent theresultsof our est imation in table3. Columns3and 5®rst comparethevariability
in outcomes within hospital cells versus doctor-hospital cells, condit ional on the year-month when
a pat ient is admit ted to a hospital. The results in column 3 re¯ ect thevariability in careut ilizat ion
and volumes within a hospital; that is, the standard deviat ion of the residual when we regress our
variables on hospital ®xed eVects and year-month dummies. The results in column 5 present our
®ndings regarding variability within a doctor-hospital unit .
Comparing the standard deviat ions in column 3 to those in column 2, we see that
within-hospital variat ion and year-month ®xed eVects account for only a small fract ion of
uncondit ional variability; less than 2 percent in utilization rates (1-0.48/ 0.49), no more than 3
percent in care volume (1-28.12/ 28.87), and about 5 percent in reimbursement (1-25.86/ 28.86).
Re-running our regression including doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, the stat ist ics in column 5 show
that variat ion in doctor-speci®c factors removes a substantially larger port ion of uncondit ional
variability than hospital-speci®c eVects: more than 7 percent in ut ilizat ion rates (1-0.45/ 0.49) and
more than 11 percent in care volumes (1-25.65/ 28.87). We further note that the uncondit ional
variability in reimbursement decreases by an addit ional 5 percent ((27.31-25.86)/ 28.86). Finally,
the stat ist ics show that doctor-hospital ®xed eVects account for an addit ional 9 percent of
uncondit ional variability in car2e volume ((28.12-25.65)/ 28.87), which triples that removed by the
hospital and year-month dummies combined. Together, these results imply the importance of
including doctor-hospital ®xed eVects in the regression analysis. They also reinforce the need for
caut ion in inferring a causal relat ion. That is, given the variability in medical spending and care
volumes accounted for by doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, it is likely that the observed gap in
12
t reatment choice between physician- and nonphysician-patients might have re¯ ected the
unobserved diVerences in doctor quality due to pat ient select ion.
Regarding theobserved diVerences in at tending doctorswho arechosen versusunchosen by end-
of-life physician-patients, the stat ist ics in Table 2 indicate that chosen doctors are highly select ive,
accounting for only less than 14 percent of all physicians who have ever attended pat ients in the
®nal year of life (2,390/ 17,401). Even within hospitals chosen by end-of-life physician-patients,
only 15 percent of a given hospitals doctors are chosen to treat an end-of-life physician-patient
(2,390/ (2,390+13,248)). Overall, the statist ics show that chosen doctors are among the most
experienced and specialized, part icularly in internal medicine, and they have a signi®cant ly larger
market share and aremore likely pract ice in mult iple locations than unchosen ones. These results
lead us to conclude that the assumptions underlying the conventional model (1) are unlikely.
Given theabovediscussion, we re-run our regressionsusing theset of covariates in our extended
model (2) and present the results in columns 4, 6, and 7 of table 3. We report the utilizat ion
coeYcientson physician-patients in thetop panel and thecorresponding coeYcients for carevolume
and spending in percent iles in the bottom panel. Since a given pat ient can check into a hospital
multiple timesduring the last six monthsof life, wereport thecluster standard errorsat thepatient
level in parentheses.
Webegin with theconvent ional model (1) towhich wethen include®xed eVects for each hospital
and year-month, in addit ion to a wide range of controls such as patient attributes, past ut ilizat ion
rates, and local market condit ions. The results in column 4 indicate that the eVect of invasive care
on theutilization rate accounts for only two percent of within-hospital variability (0.011/ 0.48) and
is not signi®cant.
When we include doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, the eVect of a physician-patient on utilizat ion
rates re¯ ectsa comparison of treatment choicesof identical pat ientsattended by thesamedoctor in
the samehospital, rather than those of patients treated by diVerent doctors. If chosen doctors are
more likely to use invasive care only for pat ients who need it , then the inclusion of doctor-hospital
®xed eVects and doctor experience in our model should yield an increase in the estimated impact
of physician-pat ients on the use of invasive care treatments. The results in column 6 support this
conjecture. Speci®cally, these results show that the estimated eVect of a physician-patient on the
probability of using any invasive care increases by 70 percent (0.019/ 0.011-1) while the impact on
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care volume increases by almost 30 percent (1.599/ 1.242-1). However, despite these increases, we
®nd that theestimated eVect of a physician-pat ient on using any of our four ident i®ed invasivecare
procedures continues to be small.
Notably, if we replace the doctor-hospital ®xed eVect qj h with a comprehensive set of controls
for t ime-invariant characterist ics of attending doctor j and hospital h, the results remain almost
unchanged. This ®nding suggests that patients generally have lit t le private information about
doctors and hospital characterist ics that our data cannot capture. Doctor quality or pract ice styles
seem to bepublic information for both the physician- and nonphysician-patients. From this result ,
we can predict that the select ion biases in our analysis aredriven primarily by factors unrelated to
doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, such as patients demand for treatment intensity.
To further adjust for patient select ion biases, we addit ionally control for pat ients previous
choices of physicians (pat ient choosiness) in column 7. The results show that including patient
choosinessmore than doubles the physician-patient eVect on invasive careut ilizat ion (0.041/ 0.019-
1) and increases theeVect on carevolumesby morethan 80percent (2.917/ 1.599-1), while theeVect
on out-of-pocket payment decreases by about a quarter (3.094/ 4.197-1). Given ident ical health
condit ions and socioeconomic characterist ics, if choosier pat ients prefer using less invasivecare but
aremorewilling to pay out of pocket for itemsnot covered by NHI coverage, then omitt ing patient
choosinesswould understate the causal eVect of physician-patients on invasive care ut ilizat ion and
overstate the impact on out-of-pocket payment, as our est imation results indicate.
Regarding themagnitudeof thecausal eVects, theestimates in column 7 suggest that theeVect
on the utilizat ion rate is approximately 9 percent of the condit ional variability within doctor and
hospital (0.041/ 0.45) and it is signi®cant. Similarly, we see the eVect of physician-patients on care
volumeaccounts for morethan 11 percent of our within-doctor-hospital variat ion (2.917/ 25.65). By
contrast, we ®nd that our physician-pat ients have three percentiles less out-of-pocket payments for
invasive care procedures, which accounts for about 12 percent (3.094/ 26.17) of the within doctor-
hospital variat ion and is signi®cant. Moreover, the results remain almost unchanged if we drop
income controls, district -speci®c time trends, or both. Overall, our ®ndings strongly suggest that
regression models should include pat ient choosiness as one of the key covariates.
Wenext rerun our regressionsusingonly pat ientsat tended by chosen doctors(matched patients)
and present our results in table 4. It is possible that our previous results may be aVected by the
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inclusion of all doctors in our sample, including those who have never treated a physician-pat ient.
That is, it is possible that our observed gap in ut ilizat ion between physician- and nonphysician-
patients might also capture the diVerence in pract ice styles between chosen and unchosen doctors.
From the results in columns2 and 4, wesee that re-running our analyses using only chosen doctors
yields est imated coeYcients for both intensive care ut ilizat ion rate and care volume that are 51
percent to 57 percent smaller (1-1.436/ 2.917 and 1-0.018/ 0.041), while the coeYcient for out-of-
pocket payment increases in magnitude by about a quarter (1-3.912/ 3.094). These results suggest
that including unchosen doctors in our sample can substant ially overstate the impact of physician-
patients on utilizat ion or other outcomes.
4 Competing Explanations
Several theories could explain our observed increase in physician-patient care volume. In this
sect ion, we examine the possibility that relat ional or informational advantages do not drive our
results. To do so, weexplore three potential explanations for our observed increase in care volume
for physician-patients: physician-pat ientsexhibit a poorer health statuscompared to nonphysician-
patients, physician-pat ients are less likely to sue for malpract ice, and, ®nally, physician-patients
diVer from nonphysician patients in unobserved ways. We examine each explanat ion below.
4.1 Physician-Patients Exhibit Poorer Health
To ensureour physician- and nonphysician-patient groupsaresimilar in health status, we includea
comprehensive list of controls for careutilizat ion in thepenultimatesix monthsof life. Nonetheless,
it remains possible that physician-patients are sicker than nonphysician-patients in a way not
captured in our model. Wetest thishypothesis by regressing theprimary causeof death for a given
patient in our sampleon a physician-patient dummy. If physician-pat ients havepoorer health than
nonphysician-patients at the end of life, then we should observe a signi®cantly posit ive coeYcient
for our physician-pat ient dummy. However, the results in table 5 show that physician-patients
are 15 percent signi®cantly less likely to die from cancer (0.0473/ 0.315). Also, physician-patients
have a less than 5 percent lower probability of dying from chronic disease or heart at tack than
nonphysician-patients, although both coeYcients are statist ically insigni®cant (0.0008/ 0.016 and
15
0.0187/ 0.865). Incidentally, wealso ®nd that thephysician-pat ients in our study are insigni®cant ly
0.61 percentagepointsmore likely to die from an accident, such asnatural disaster, car accident or
food poisoning. Although thisest imated coeYcient on accidentsaccounts for morethan aquarter of
the sample mean among nonphysician-patients (0.0061/ 0.022), dying from an accident is unlikely
related to diVerences in lifestyles or other unobserved health condit ions between physician- and
nonphysician-patients. Based on the above®ndings, we conclude that our ®nding of increased care
volume is not attributable to the poorer health status of physician-patients.
4.2 Physician-Patients are Less Likely to Sue for M alpractice
Another possible explanat ion for our ®nding of increased invasive care for physician-patients is
that physician-patients are less likely than nonphysician-patients to sue for malpract ice. During
our data period (2000-2006), medical doctors in Taiwan were subject to both no-fault liability
and joint and severe liability (Chen et al., 2012). AsCurrie and MacLeod (2008) suggest, concerns
about potential liability if complicat ionsarisemay makedoctorscaut iousabout prescribing invasive
care, especially for nonphysician-pat ients in our context. To test this explanat ion, we examine the
frequency of possible malpractice lawsuits for the physicians in our data. In Taiwan, physicians
in the ER are thosemost likely to be sued and to make the highest median payment (Chen et al.
2012). However, the majority of our physician-patients checked into the department of internal
medicine, rather than the ER; only four hospital admissions in the data are by physician-patients.
Stat istics in TableA4 suggest that only oneor fewer malpractice lawsuitsper 1,000 internal medical
doctors likely appear in our data. These stat ist ics suggest that defensive medicine is an unlikely
explanation for themagnitude of the increased utilization rates among physician-patients.
4.3 Physician-Patients DiVer from Nonphysician-Patients in Unobserved Ways
Despite our best attempts to control for socioeconomic backgrounds (including each bene®ciarys
sex, age, employment status, income percentile, and district of residence during the penult imate
six monthsof life), it is possible that our physician- and nonphysician-pat ients diVer on dimensions
not included in our study, such as wealth, educat ion, or level of risk aversion. We direct ly test
whether invasive care intensity changes with either informat ional or relat ional advantages among
physician-pat ients. While all physician-pat ients have closer professional relat ionships with their
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attending doctors and greater access to medical information, these advantages can vary across the
composit ions of physician-pat ients and their attending doctors. For example, if both the patient
and attending doctor specialize in a non-surgical area, then they are more likely to have a closer
professional relat ionship but less likely to have relevant knowledge or clinical experience related to
invasive care complicat ions. By looking into the variat ion in treatment intensity among physician-
patients who have either a closer professional relat ionship or more relevant clinical experience, we
can address the potent ial issue of omitted variable bias. In the next sect ion, we expand on this
idea and document our ®ndings.
5 Informational and Relational Advantages of Physician-Patients
This section further invest igates the relat ive importance of the relational versus the informational
advantage eVect of physician-pat ients on care volumes. To study the relat ive importance of each
advantage, we expand model (2) to allow the total eVect b to vary with the relevance of medical
knowledge and the professional relat ionship between the patient and the attending doctor. By
comparing the care volumes across various specialty composit ions among physician-patients and
attending doctors, we can extract those parts of the physician-patient eVect related to having a
professional connection, which the previous studies often interpret as an informational eVect. In
doing so, we ®nd that the eVect of a closer professional relat ionship is substant ially more likely to
explain why physician-patientsut ilizemore invasivecare, compared to the informat ional advantage
mechanism.
5.1 The Expanded Model
To consider both informat ional and relational channels, we ®rst de®ne an informational indicator ,
Si, for pat ient i with surgical expertise. Among physician-patients whose specialty is not surgical
(Si = 0), thosewho shareamedical specialty with their attending doctor havea closer professional
relat ionship. The informat ional eVect on treatment intensity, at least in part, captures the impact
of a closer professional relat ionship between the doctor and the pat ient.
This discussion leads us to de®ne a relational indicator, Rij = I { Si = Sj } , for whether patient
i and attending doctor j share the same specialty area. Physician-patients and attending doctors
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whobelong to thesamespecialty areamay havemet in training programsor professional workshops
and may belong to the same specialist associat ion. On the other hand, patients and doctors may
have met in non-specialty contexts, such as medical school, even if they do not share the same
specialty. In several speci®cations, we add controls for whether both the physician-pat ient and
attending doctor are in the same cohort (with seven or fewer years apart at the time they are
cert i®ed, re¯ ect ing theseven-year medical education path) aswell aswhether thephysician-patient
is lessexperienced than theattending doctor. It isnoteworthy that Si × Di = Si andRij × Di = Rij
by construct ion.
Weassumethat either the informat ional or relational channel can determinehow thephysician-
patient dummyDi aVectstreatment intensity. Thus, holdingconstant therelat ional indicator allows
us to interpret the variation in the informational indicator as a re¯ ect ion of changing physician-
patient medical knowledge relevant to invasive care. Hence, we expand model (2) by interact ing
both information and relat ional indicators with our physician-pat ient dummy in the model. That
is, we allow the physician-pat ient eVect b to vary with the informational and relat ional indicators,
Si and Rij :
b ij = b? + b?Si + b?Rij . (3)
In theabovespeci®cation, for a non-surgical physician-patient whoseattending doctor is a surgeon
(Si = 0 = Rij ), the physician-patient eVect is b?. By contrast , if both the patient and the doctor
specialize in a surgical area (Si = 1 = Rij ), then the eVect equals b? + b? + b?. By exploit ing the
variat ion in the specialty composit ion of the doctor and the patient in the data, we can identify
the relat ive importance of informat ion and relat ional eVects on treatment intensity, b? and b?.
In the previous studies, all physician-patients and attending doctors are in the same specialty
(Si = 1 = Rij ). With no variat ion in specialt ies in thedata, it is unlikely to separate the relat ional
and informational eVects.
Moreover, it is possible that nonphysician-patients in our study also have a relationship with
their attending doctor, albeit not a professional one, which might aVect treatment intensity. To
address this potent ial relat ionship, we follow Johnson et al. (2016) to de®ne a strong preexisting
clinical relationship indicator (r ij ) for doctor j who has attended over 50 percent (around the
median) of patient i s hospital admissions during the penult imate six months of life. Because
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the patient-doctor preexist ing clinical relat ionship also carries informat ion about the past hospital
care utilizat ion of a given patient, we continue to include past hospital care utilizat ion during the
penult imate six months of life in X .
Finally, the coeYcients b? and b? on the informational and relat ional indicators respect ively
represent the relat ive importance of informational and relat ional eVects of physician-pat ients on
the extent of invasive care, all others equal.
5.2 Estimation Results
Table 6 summarizes our est imat ion results using our expanded ®xed-eVect model (3) including
patient choosiness, doctor experience, and doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, as before. To make our
results comparable with the previous ®nding, we document the est imates in this table using all
pat ients (including unmatched patients) as in column 2 of table 4. If we use the matched data,
the estimated coeYcients on relational and informational eVects (b? and b?) are almost unchanged
although the standard errors increaseslight ly. The top panel of table 6 shows theestimated eVects
on the ut ilizat ion rates while the bottom panel reports the eVects on care volumes.
Lookingat the®rst threecolumnsof table6, weseethat our est imated coeYcients for physician-
patients who are better informed are all small, insigni®cant, or even negative, with or with the
inclusion of relat ional controls. These coeYcients contrast with the large, signi®cant, posit ive ones
for our total eVects (reported in table 4 and at the bottom of this table). This result suggests
that more relevant medical knowledge cannot explain the higher use of invasive care for physician-
patients. Column 1 of the top panel shows that the coeYcient on the informational advantage is
negative, opposite to the sign of the total eVect. Although the result in column 1 of the bottom
panel suggests that the informat ional advantage can explain about 24 percent of the total eVect
on care volumes (0.71/ 2.92), this ®nding is stat ist ically insigni®cant. By contrast , the result in
column 2 of the bottom panel suggests that physician-pat ients who share a specialty with their
at tending doctor have a ®ve percentage points higher ut ilizat ion rate and receive four percentage
points more volume. These est imates suggest that the relat ional channel is more important than
the informat ional channel in explaining the diVerence in invasive care between physician- and
nonphysician-patients.
Cont inuing with Table 6, the results in column 3 shows that the results in column 2 are
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robust, after including addit ional dummies for the professional but non-surgical related
relat ionships. Column 3 shows that a closer professional relat ionship with the attending doctor is
signi®cantly associated with a 5.5 percentage point higher invasive care utilizat ion rate and a 4.0
percentage point higher volume of care, representing 12 and 16 percent of the standard deviat ion
within a doctor-hospital unit (0.055/ 0.45 and 4.03/ 25.65), respect ively. Both exceed the total
eVect by at least 20 percent (0.055/ 0.041-1 and 4.03/ 2.92). The results by individual invasive
procedure, in columns 4 to 7, show similar pat terns although the estimated coeYcient on the
professional relat ionship is mostly imprecise.
It is noteworthy that invasive care volume signi®cantly increases with a closer professional
relat ionship but strongly decreases with a stronger pre-exist ing clinical relat ionship. When
doctors share a specialty with their physician-pat ients, they can communicate more eVectively
and professionally about the need for invasive care. By contrast , doctors who have an exist ing
clinical relat ionship with a physician- or nonphysician-patient may bemore empathet ic to patient
discomfort and thus more reluctant to prescribe invasive care. Finally, our results in table A1
using days-in-hospital and medical cost show similar patterns, albeit insigni®cantly so.
5.3 Financial Incentives
To better understand our ®ndings, in this subsection, we test whether our observed professional
relat ionship eVect varies with a change in the ®nancial incentive environment, speci®cally the
introduction of a global expenditure cap in July 2002. As discussed, the NHI began imposing a
quarterly expenditure cap in each region in 2002 to combat increasing expenditures. This cap was
placed on top of the fee-for-servicesystem, setting theconversion rateex-post by taking therat io of
the expenditure cap to the regional aggregate volume. Given this expenditure cap, providers may
choose to control volume in order to raiseconversion values. Given the incentive to control volume,
one possibility is that doctors would priorit ize the appropriate use of invasive care to physician-
patients, who have professional connect ions or better information. By contrast, if the markup is
low, most likely at the end of the quarter, physician-pat ients could be less aVected by incentives
to raise invasive care volume, again because of professional connections or more information. We
examine these two possibilit ies.
Weestimate a diVerence-in-diVerencemodel to compare invasive care volumes before and after
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the policy changebetween physician- and nonphysician-pat ients. The results in table 7, columns 1
and 2, show no increase in thephysician-patient eVect with thechange in the®nancial environment.
From the results in column 2, we see that the coeYcient on the interact ion between post-2002 July
and the end of the quarter is signi®cant ly posit ive, showing no evidence of volume controls. Given
that theexpenditurecap causesdoctors to compete for quant ity rather than ration care, this result
suggests that doctors may not priorit ize invasive care for physician-patients.
Cont inuing with table 7, we ®nd in columns 3 to 7 that physician-patients with either
informational or relat ional advantages are less aVected by the change in the ®nancial
environment, although the est imated changes in the eVects are not precise enough to be
conclusive. The coeYcients on the interact ion between post-2002 July and the indicators for
being more informed or having the same specialty (a stronger professional relat ionship) account
for more than 20 percent of the standard deviation in care volume among patients treated by the
same doctor in the same hospital (6.08/ 25.65 and 5.47/ 25.65), but the standard errors of both
est imates are large. In contrast, columns 3 to 7 suggest that the impact of a stronger preexist ing
clinical relat ionship remains substantial (between 3 to 6 percentage points, or 22 percent of the
variability within doctor and hospital) and almost unchanged throughout our data period. The
coeYcient on the clinical relationship and the coeYcient on its interact ion with post-2002 July are
both precisely estimated with small standard errors.
6 Conclusion
This study compares the invasive care treatment and volume of end-of-life care for physician-
versus non-physician patients in order to invest igate the agency problems in healthcare. Previous
studies have found that, given the same observed health and socioeconomic condit ions, physician-
patients may select doctors by quality or pract ice styles for their end-of-life care. However, a
signi®cant concern with past est imates of the physician-patient eVects on treatment choice is that
the doctors chosen by physician-patientsmay diVer from other doctors in unobservable ways. Our
study addresses this issue and adjusts for patient self-select ion by comparing treatment choices
between physician- and nonphysician-patients treated by the samedoctor in the samehospital and
by controlling for patients past choices of doctors and doctors experience.
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Perhaps surprisingly, adjust ing for doctors at tributes and experience does not signi®cant ly
change the estimation result . In contrast , adjust ing for patients previous choice of doctors makes
substantial diVerences; the estimated eVect of physician-patients on utilizat ion more than doubles
and theestimated eVect on carevolume increasesby more than 80 percent. Asour result indicates,
patient selection cannot be ignored and including patients past choice isan eVect iveway to address
the select ion bias.
We ®nd that physician-pat ients in the last six months of life are approximately equally likely
to use invasive care as nonphysician-patients but that these physician-pat ients receive more care
volume. Weexaminealternativeexplanationsfor thisresult including thepossibility that physician-
patientshavepoorer health statusor arelesslikely tosuefor malpract ice. Wecannot easily reconcile
our est imation results with these competing explanations.
Further, we address unobserved diVerences in patients characterist ics by direct ly test ing if the
physician-pat ient eVects on invasive care utilizat ion and volume vary with more relevant medical
information or a closer professional relat ionship with the attending doctor. In this analysis, we
®nd that the closer professional relat ionship with the attending doctor is the main driver for the
posit ive eVect of physician-patients on care volume. In contrast , we ®nd that the eVect of more
relevant information on care volume is small and stat ist ically insigni®cant.
Our posit ive eVect of physician-patients on care volume is consistent with the ®ndings that
greater intensive care treatment can prolong life. For example, Balsa and McGuire (2003) and
Currie, MacLeod, and an Parys (2015) show that patients bene®t from the aggressive treatment
of lung cancer or heart attacks through theuseof invasiveprocedures. Finally, weexaminewhether
our results are sensit ive to ®nancial incentives. Speci®cally, we study whether the increased use of
invasive care at the ends of accounting quarters has an impact on our observed physician-patient
eVect . Our results show that the eVect of professional relat ionships between physician-patients
with their attending doctors somewhat decreases with the introduction of a global expenditure
cap, although the estimat ion results are imprecise.
Overall, our study employs a sophist icated approach and unique database to identify the
relat ional channel that can explain most of the variat ion in the physician-pat ient t reatment
choices at the end-of-life. This new piece of empirical evidence suggests that other things equal,
doctor-patient relat ionships can play a more crit ical role in determining physician treatment
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choices, compared to patients medical knowledge.
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Table 1: Hospital and InvasiveCareUse of Bene®ciaries in the Last Six Months of Life
Nonphysicians Physicians minus Standard
mean Nonphysicians Error
Number of bene®ciaries 765,649 766,638 -
Number of admissions 1,366,507 1,364,840 -
Hospital utilization
Ever checked into a hospital 0.75 0.10 0.011**
Number of admissions 1.53 0.21 0.041**
Total number of days in hospital 64.38 15.95 2.143**
Average number of days per admission 32.5 8.59 1.016**
Ever use an invasive procedure
Any invasive procedure 0.51 0.08 0.013**
Nasogastric intubation 0.40 0.09 0.014**
Urinary catheterizat ion 0.36 0.06 0.013**
Endotracheal intubat ion 0.21 0.04 0.012**
Tracheostomy intubation 0.30 0.07 0.013**
Used volume in percentile if > 0
Total expenditure in NHI items 61.8 5.74 0.779**
Total reimbursement for hospital care 61.8 6.01 0.775**
Out-of-pocket payment on NHI items 57.3 -6.93 0.957**
Hemodialysis 58.0 2.03 0.944**
Any invasive procedure 60.1 3.58 0.885**
Nasogastric intubation 58.4 4.16 0.930**
Urinary catheterizat ion 57.7 0.81 0.948
Endotracheal intubat ion 55.4 1.11 1.009
Tracheostomy intubation 56.8 3.86 0.987**
Demographics 1 year before death
Male 0.62 0.36 0.005**
Age at death 69.10 6.11 0.444**
Full t ime work 0.68 0.12 0.013**
Cert i®ed low income 0.02 -0.02 0.001**
Income percent ile 50 -2.143 1.286
Sorting
Bene®ciary checked into a chosen hospital 0.64 0.21 0.011**
Bene®ciary saw a chosen doctor 0.21 0.65 0.011**
Cause of death
Heart attack 0.03 0.00 0.006
Acute disease 0.15 -0.03 0.010**
Accident 0.06 -0.02 0.006**
Suicide 0.03 -0.02 0.003**
Chronic disease 0.76 0.07 0.012**
Cancer 0.22 0.05 0.014**
Note: This table covers the 766,638 deceased bene®ciaries (including 989 medical doctors) during the last
six months of life, recorded in Taiwans NHI system over the period of 200106. We also include persons
who have never checked into a hospital (with spending and utilizat ion indicated as zero). We use hospital
admission data and cluster the standard errors at theperson level. Stat ist ics regarding payment, expenditure,
reimbursement, and care volumes are indicated in percent iles for the 578,436 deceased bene®ciaries (including
846 medical doctors) who had checked into a hospital in the last six months of life. 742,961 bene®ciaries have
non-missing information about income. ** indicates the 95 percent signi®cance level.
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Table2: SampleMean of Attending Doctors, by whether Chosen by Physician-Patients in theLast
ear of Life
Unchosen doctors
Chosen working in
doctors chosen Unchosen
mean hospital hospital Mean diVerence
(1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3)
Number of attending doctors 2,390 13,248 1,763 15,638 15,011
ears of experience at at tending 9.030 7.104 8.564 1.926** -1.460**
Number of licenses 1.196 1.237 1.218 -0.041** 0.018
Female 0.064 0.101 0.070 -0.037** 0.031**
External medicine 0.262 0.486 0.408 -0.224** 0.078**
Pract ice in mult iple districts 0.581 0.481 0.449 0.100** 0.031**
Pract ice in mult iple counties 0.397 0.345 0.317 0.052** 0.029**
Hospital characteristics:
Teaching hospital 0.149 0.113 0.003 0.037 0.109**
eteran hospital 0.140 0.083 0.000 0.058 0.083**
Private hospital 0.419 0.337 0.178 0.082** 0.160**
Number of providers in district 168 159 113 9 45**
Number of beds in district 104 106 69 -3 37**
Patient composition and share
Physician-patients 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.011** 0.000
Choosy patients 0.588 0.070 0.046 0.518** 0.024**
Specialty-speci®c market share 0.283 0.167 0.207 0.116** -0.040
Usage rates of invasive care: 0.623 0.558 0.441 0.066** 0.117**
Nasogastric intubation 0.491 0.387 0.287 0.104** 0.100**
Urinary catheterizat ion 0.431 0.393 0.308 0.039** 0.084**
Endotracheal intubation 0.210 0.167 0.090 0.044** 0.077**
Tracheostomy intubation 0.351 0.258 0.151 0.093** 0.107**
Volume per patient in percentile:
Any invasive care 51 45 39 6** 7**
Nasogastric intubation 51 45 41 6** 4**
Urinary catheterizat ion 50 48 43 3** 5**
Endotracheal intubation 49 47 44 2** 4**
Tracheostomy intubation 52 46 41 6** 5**
Reimbursement 51 46 30 5** 16**
Out of pocket 49 52 48 -3** 5**
Note: This table includes all 17,401 cert i®ed doctors who have ever at tended patients in the last year life
during our sample period 200006. Choosy pat ients have more than one half of their admissions attended
by chosen doctors. ** indicates the 95 percent signi®cance level.
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Table 3: Physician-Patients EVects on Hospital Care and InvasiveCare Utilizat ion in the Last Six Months of Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Nonphysician Within hospital Within doctor-hospital
pat ients CoeYcient on physician-pat ient
Dependent admissions CoeYcient on Adding doctor Adding patient Adjusted
variables Mean SD SD physician-pat ient SD experience choosiness R-squared
Days in hospital 41.97 25.37 24.54 0.836 (0.768) 23.78 0.783 (0.761) 0.999 (0.762) 0.124
Any invasive procedure 0.61 0.49 0.48 0.011 (0.013) 0.45 0.019 (0.013) 0.041 (0.013)** 0.148
Nasogastric intubat ion 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.025 (0.013)* 0.46 0.032 (0.013)** 0.052 (0.013)** 0.152
Urinary catheterization 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.022 (0.013)* 0.47 0.024 (0.013)* 0.039 (0.013)** 0.119
Endotracheal intubation 0.22 0.41 0.41 0.019 (0.010)* 0.39 0.020 (0.010)** 0.034 (0.010)** 0.113
Tracheostomy intubat ion 0.32 0.46 0.46 0.018 (0.011) 0.41 0.022 (0.010)** 0.040 (0.010)** 0.237
Volume in percentile
Any invasive procedure 49.49 28.87 28.12 1.242 (0.768) 25.65 1.599 (0.739)** 2.917 (0.740)** 0.221
Nasogastric intubat ion 49.49 28.87 28.14 1.780 (0.778)** 26.50 2.192 (0.762)** 3.200 (0.764)** 0.167
Urinary catheterization 49.50 28.87 28.39 1.648 (0.751)** 27.34 1.708 (0.750)** 2.550 (0.751)** 0.109
Endotracheal intubation 49.50 28.87 28.59 0.164 (0.698) 27.67 0.133 (0.683) 1.007 (0.684) 0.073
Tracheostomy intubat ion 49.49 28.86 28.40 1.849 (0.711)** 26.16 2.079 (0.667)** 2.986 (0.668)** 0.177
Reimbursement 49.49 28.86 27.31 0.535 (0.777) 25.86 0.507 (0.769) 1.267 (0.771) 0.197
Out of pocket 49.49 28.87 28.04 -4.324 (0.762)** 26.17 -4.197 (0.746)** -3.094 (0.747)** 0.215
Note: We include the 578,436 nonphysician-pat ients and 989 physician-pat ients who ever checked into a hospital at the last six months of life, at the
age 29 or older, including ret irees. Combining their admission data with non-missing self-reported income yields 1,152,248 and 1,667, respect ively.
Column 3 presents information after removing hospital ®xed eVects and year-month ®xed eVects, while Column 5 addit ionally removes doctor-hospital
®xed eVects. The regressions in Columns 4 and 7 also include patient att ributes (sex, age, and the full set of dummies for full-t ime work, cert i®ed low
income, income percentile), risk factors in the penult imate six months of life (whether checked into a hospital, the average number of days in hospital
per admission, the total medical spending, and medical spending in invasive care), and the local market condit ions (measured by provider counts and
bed counts in the district). Wecluster standard errors at the pat ient level in (.). * and ** indicate the 90 and 95 percent signi®cance levels, respect ively.
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Table 4: Benchmark Results Using the Full versusMatched Data
Within hospital & doctor in the full model
All pat ients Matched patients
CoeYcient on CoeYcient on
Dependent variables: SD physician-patient SD physician-patient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in hospital 23.78 0.999 (0.762) 25.94 0.826 (0.762)
Any invasive procedure 0.45 0.041 (0.013)** 0.45 0.018 (0.013)
Nasogastric intubation 0.46 0.052 (0.013)** 0.46 0.032 (0.013)**
Urinary catheterizat ion 0.47 0.039 (0.013)** 0.47 0.022 (0.013)*
Endotracheal intubation 0.39 0.034 (0.010)** 0.38 -0.002 (0.010)
Tracheostomy intubation 0.41 0.040 (0.010)** 0.40 0.007 (0.010)
Volume in percentile
Any invasive procedure 25.65 2.917 (0.740)** 25.82 1.436 (0.740)*
Nasogastric intubation 26.50 3.200 (0.764)** 26.84 2.520 (0.762)**
Urinary catheterizat ion 27.34 2.550 (0.751)** 27.42 1.700 (0.751)**
Endotracheal intubation 27.67 1.007 (0.684) 27.60 -0.839 (0.684)
Tracheostomy intubation 26.16 2.986 (0.668)** 26.14 1.564 (0.670)**
Reimbursement 25.86 1.267 (0.771) 26.28 0.472 (0.770)
Out of pocket 26.17 -3.094 (0.747)** 25.81 -3.912 (0.744)**
Number of admissions 1,153,915 321,655
All regressions in this table include year-month ®xed eVects, doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, doctor
experience, pat ient at t ributes (sex, age, the full set of dummies for full-t ime work, cert i®ed low
income, and incomepercent ile), risk factors in thepenult imatesix monthsof life (whether checked
into a hospital, theaveragenumber of days in hospital per admission, the total medical spending,
and medical spending in invasive care), the local market condit ions (measured by provider counts
and bed counts in the district ), and pat ient choosiness.  Accident indicates the cause of death
related to a car accident or food poisoning. We cluster standard errors at the pat ient level in (.).
* and ** indicate the 90 and 95 percent signi®cance levels.
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Table 5: Are Physician-Patients Sicker than Nonphysician-Pat ients?
Main cause of death
Heart attack Accident Suicide Chronic disease Cancer
Physician-patient -0.0008 0.0061 -0.0008 -0.0187 -0.0473**
(0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0011) (0.0125) (0.0161)
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.146 0.072 0.078 0.299
Nonphysician mean 0.016 0.022 0.008 0.865 0.315
Note: Using data based on 1,153,915 hospital admissions, all regressions in this table include year-month
®xed eVects, doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, doctor experience, pat ient at t ributes (sex, age, the full set of
dummies for full-t ime work, cert i®ed low income, and income percent ile), risk factors in the penult imate
six monthsof life (whether checked into a hospital , theaveragenumber of days in hospital per admission,
the total medical spending, and medical spending in invasivecare), the local market condit ions (measured
by provider counts and bed counts in the district ), and pat ient choosiness.  Accident indicates cause of
death related to a car accident or food poisoning. We cluster standard errors at the pat ient level in (.).
** indicates the 95 percent signi®cance level.
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Table 6: Informational and Relat ional EVects of Physician-Pat ients on Ut ilizat ion/ olume
Nasogastric Urinary Endotracheal Tracheostomy
Any invasive procedure intubation catheter intubat ion intubation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Utilizat ion
Physician-patient 0.057 0.041 0.045 0.049 0.027 0.101** 0.073*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.046) (0.047) (0.039) (0.044) (0.037)
More informed -0.018 -0.043 -0.035 0.005 -0.006 -0.044 -0.030
Physician-patient (S) (0.040) (0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.036) (0.049) (0.032)
Professional relat ionship
Same specialty (R) 0.051* 0.055* 0.034 0.042 0.031 0.002
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024)
Same cohort -0.002 -0.012 0.008 -0.024 -0.007
(0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020)
Less experienced -0.017 -0.025 -0.022 -0.044 -0.014
(0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.034) (0.029)
Strong preexist ing -0.083** -0.073** -0.063** -0.055** -0.033**
clinical relat ionship (r ) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Within doctor-hospital 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.47 0.39
standard deviat ion
Total eVect 0.041** 0.052** 0.039** 0.034** 0.040**
olume in percent ile
Physician-patient 2.35 1.20 1.67 2.96 1.12 4.80* 1.88
(2.12) (2.12) (2.73) (2.73) (2.73) (2.50) (2.45)
More informed 0.71 -1.13 -0.13 2.72 -1.29 -2.09 -1.41
Physician-patient (S) (2.26) (2.61) (2.88) (2.68) (2.39) (2.80) (2.19)
Professional relat ionship
Same specialty (R) 3.76** 4.03** 2.38 3.52** 3.71** 0.04
(1.82) (1.81) (1.73) (1.68) (1.71) (1.61)
Same cohort 0.35 -0.73 1.20 -0.75 -0.60
(1.47) (1.49) (1.40) (1.45) (1.49)
Less experienced -2.15 -4.19** -0.25 -3.43* 0.65
(1.93) (1.90) (1.73) (1.94) (1.95)
Strong preexist ing -4.62** -3.55** -3.50** -3.05** -1.97**
clinical relat ionship (r ) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Within doctor-hospital 25.65 26.50 26.16 27.34 27.67
standard deviat ion
Total eVect 2.92** 3.20** 2.55** 1.01 2.99**
Note: See table 6 for the included control variables. We cluster standard errors at the patient level in (.). ** and * indicate the 95
and 90 percent signi®cance levels, respect ively.
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Table 7: Informat ional and Relat ional Impacts on Standardized Care olume, Before and After
Global Budgeting
olume in percent ile
Nasogastric Urinary Endotracheal Tracheostomy
Any invasive procedure intubation catheter intubation intubat ion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Physician-patient 2.07** 2.17** -2.83 0.27 -1.72 -1.12 -2.26
(0.88) (0.99) (2.04) (1.89) (1.97) (1.78) (1.93)
Physician-patient
× Post -2.02 -1.89 2.70 0.86 0.85 -0.95 2.35
(1.63) (1.76) (3.57) (3.20) (3.69) (3.21) (3.41)
× End of quarter -0.55 -0.52 1.02 -0.12 -0.43 -1.43
(2.14) (2.15) (2.04) (2.08) (2.30) (2.04)
× End of quarter × Post -1.16 -1.05 -1.33 -3.20 -0.83 3.53
(4.01) (4.03) (4.27) (4.26) (4.37) (3.89)
End of quarter -0.17 -0.17 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 -0.21
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
End of quarter × Post 0.71** 0.71** 0.32 0.42 0.34 0.61*
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35)
More informed (S) 2.67 0.45 4.15 0.47 3.83
(3.39) (3.10) (3.11) (2.28) (2.99)
Same specialty (R) 5.49** 3.17 3.71* 0.27 4.82**
(2.29) (2.14) (2.15) (1.95) (2.08)
A stronger preexist ing -5.76** -4.09** -3.71** -3.22** -4.53**
clinical relat ionship (r ) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Post
× More informed (S) -6.08 -6.99 -6.26 2.02 -7.70*
(5.13) (4.76) (5.17) (4.52) (4.54)
× Same specialty (R) -5.47 -3.25 -0.91 -0.21 -4.35
(3.82) (3.57) (3.79) (3.43) (3.70)
× Stronger preexisting -0.14 -0.34 -0.05 0.39 -0.04
clinical relat ionship (r ) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30)
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.21
Within doctor-hospital
standard deviat ion 25.65 25.65 25.65 26.50 27.34 27.67 26.17
Total eVect 2.92** 2.92** 2.92** 3.20** 2.55** 1.01 2.99**
Note: All regressions in this table include year-month ®xed eVects, doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, doctor experience, pat ient att ributes
(sex, age, the full set of dummies for full-t ime work, cert i®ed low income, and income percent ile), risk factors in the penult imate six
months of life (whether checked into a hospital , the average number of days in hospital per admission, the total medical spending,
and medical spending in invasive care), the local market condit ions (measured by provider counts and bed counts in the district),
and pat ient choosiness. We cluster standard errors at the pat ient level in (.). ** and * indicate the 95 and 90 percent signi®cance
levels, respect ively.
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Table A1: Informational and Relational Components of Physician-Patient Impacts
on Hospital Stay and Standardized Cost
olume in percentile
Days in hospital Reimbursement Out of pocket
Physician-patient -2.31 -2.94 -2.93 -1.35 -1.60 -1.85 -1.31 -1.13 -0.75
(2.34) (2.26) (2.75) (2.49) (2.41) (2.94) (1.84) (1.90) (2.62)
More informed -3.91 -2.89 -2.87 -3.13 -2.72 -2.98 2.01 1.71 0.75
physician-patient (S) (2.47) (2.85) (3.12) (2.61) (2.96) (3.19) (2.01) (2.18) (2.32)
Professional relat ionship
Same specialty (R) 2.09 2.04 0.85 0.91 -0.61 -0.43
(1.85) (1.85) (1.85) (1.85) (1.61) (1.62)
Same cohort 0.07 0.36 0.58
(1.59) (1.56) (1.46)
Less experienced 0.04 -0.28 -2.00
(2.08) (2.08) (2.06)
Strong preexist ing 1.23** -1.26** -2.30**
clinical relat ionship (r ) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22
Within doctor-hospital
standard deviat ion 23.78 25.86 26.17
Total eVect 1.00 1.27 -3.09**
Note: All regressions in this table include year-month ®xed eVects, doctor-hospital ®xed eVects, doctor experience, patient
at t ributes (sex, age, the full set of dummies for full-t imework, cert i®ed low income, and income percent ile), risk factors in
the penult imate six months of life (whether checked into a hospital , the average number of days in hospital per admission,
the total medical spending, and medical spending in invasive care), the local market condit ions (measured by provider
counts and bed counts in the district), and pat ient choosiness. We cluster standard errors at the patient level in (.). **
and * indicate the 95 and 90 percent signi®cance levels, respect ively.
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Table A2: Physician-Patient EVects on Hospital and Invasive CareUt ilizat ion, Before and After Hospital Global Budgeting
Days Any Nasogastric Urinary Endotracheal Tracheostomy
in hospital invasive procedure intubation catheter intubation intubation
Physician-pat ient 0.891 0.868 0.027 0.026 0.044** 0.026 0.004 0.017
(0.905) (1.003) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
Physician-pat ient
× Post -0.504 -1.304 -0.030 -0.034 -0.049 -0.013 0.001 -0.013
(1.591) (1.682) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.022) (0.024)
× End of quarter 0.261 0.003 0.017 0.012 -0.020 -0.014
(2.289) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032)
× End of quarter × Post 5.705 0.027 -0.005 -0.010 -0.051 -0.057
(4.946) (0.074) (0.071) (0.078) (0.056) (0.058)
End of quarter -1.754** -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.187) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
End of quarter × Post -0.007 0.017** 0.011* 0.013** 0.012** 0.012**
(0.350) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Adjusted R-squared 0.117 0.118 0.154 0.154 0.163 0.122 0.150 0.277
Within doctor-hospital
standard deviat ion 23.78 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.39 0.41
Total eVect 0.999 0.041** 0.052** 0.039** 0.034** 0.040**
Note: We cluster standard errors at the pat ient level in (.). ** and * indicate the 95 and 90 percent signi®cance levels, respect ively. See the note of
Table 3 for details.
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Table A3: Physician-Patient EVects on Standardized Care olume and Cost, Before and After Hospital Global Budget ing
Standardized volume and cost
Invasive Nasogastric Urinary Endotracheal Tracheostomy Out of
care intubation catheter intubation intubation Reimbursement pocket
Physician-patient 2.068** 2.173** 3.077** 2.009** -0.511 2.308** 0.441 -4.423**
(0.879) (0.986) (1.033) (1.011) (0.945) (0.915) (1.014) (0.944)
Physician-patient
× Post -2.023 -1.892 -2.239 -0.576 -0.743 -1.725 0.170 1.621
(1.626) (1.765) (1.744) (1.850) (1.599) (1.539) (1.780) (1.792)
× End of quarter -0.553 0.976 -0.105 -0.441 -1.429 -0.345 1.092
(2.137) (2.032) (2.053) (2.312) (2.035) (2.032) (1.948)
× End of quarter × Post -1.157 -1.316 -3.194 -0.964 3.462 0.597 -3.143
(4.012) (4.250) (4.225) (4.364) (3.882) (4.295) (3.969)
End of quarter -0.167 -0.118 -0.001 -0.037 -0.205 -0.676** 0.312*
(0.183) (0.192) (0.197) (0.202) (0.188) (0.188) (0.182)
End of quarter × Post 0.705** 0.315 0.413 0.340 0.610* 0.258 0.130
(0.348) (0.360) (0.370) (0.370) (0.354) (0.354) (0.339)
Adjusted R-squared 0.245 0.245 0.179 0.115 0.097 0.207 0.152 0.232
Nonphysician-pat ients
standard deviat ion
within doctor-hospital 25.65 26.50 27.34 27.67 26.16 25.86 26.17
Total eVect 2.917** 3.200** 2.550** 1.007 2.986** 1.267 -3.094**
Note: We cluster standard errors at the pat ient level in (.). ** and * indicate the 95 and 90 percent signi®cance levels, respectively.
See the note of Table 3 for details.
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Table A4: Numbers of Lost Lawsuits and End-of-Life Hospital Admissions
Lost lawsuits Admissions of
per 100 physician-patients
physicians/ year in the last year of life
The attending doctors specialty during 200008 during 200006
Emergency medicine 10.7 4
Neurosurgery 6.5 0
Obstetrics, gynecology, or anesthesiology 0.9 4
Plastic surgery 0.6 0
Orthopedics 0.4 6
General surgery 0.2 277
Ophthalmology 0.2 3
Internal medicine 0.1 1,131
Neurology <0.1 73
Family medicine <0.1 69
Therapeut ic radiology and oncology <0.1 14
Pediatrics <0.1 10
Otolaryngology <0.1 8
Physical medicine and rehabilitation <0.1 4
Urology <0.1 5
Psychiatry <0.1 5
Occupational medicine <0.1 3
Note: Column (1) is derived from Table1 of Chen et al. (2012), in which 35 percent of the 404 lost
lawsuits led to pat ient death. We calculate column (2) using the hospital admissions of the 989
deceased physicians in Table 1. We group the stat ist ics for anesthesiology with those of obstetrics
and gynecology because of privacy issues related to the small cell size.
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